

Intelligent Buildings Council (IBC) Webinar/Meeting will commence 12:05pm ET

Thursday, February 27, 2025 | 12 NOON – 1:30 PM (ET)

IBC Chair: Bob Allan (NAVCO Inc.) Vice-Chair: Harsha Chandrashekar (Honeywell International Inc.) Vice-Chair: Robert Lane (Robert H. Lane and Associates Inc.) Vice-Chair: Chris Larry (exp US Services Inc.)

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Agenda Marta Klopotowska (ASHB)

- 1. Call to Order, Welcome, Introductions, About IBC
- 2. Administrative
- 3. Research Update
- Keynote: Cybersecurity Best Practices Safeguarding Your Network and Building Systems - Brad Bonfiglio, Schneider Electric
- 5. ASHB Podcast
- 6. ASHB Whitepapers & Research Library
- 7. ASHB Journal
- 8. New Business
- 9. Announcements
- 10. Adjournment



1. Call to Order, Welcome, Introductions, About the IBC Bob Allan (NAVCO, Inc.)



IBC Chair Bob Allan Vice President of Sales, East Region NAVCO, Inc.



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Honeywell

IBC Vice-Chair Harsha Chandrashekar Product Approvals & Regulatory Leader Honeywell International



IBC Vice-Chair Robert Lane President & Managing Partner, Robert H. Lane and Associates Inc.



IBC Vice-Chair Chris Larry Director of Energy Engineering Exp US Services Inc.



The ASHB Intelligent Buildings Council works to strengthen the large building automation industry through innovative technology-driven research projects. The Council was established in 2001 by ASHB to specifically review opportunities, take strategic action, and monitor initiatives that relate to integrated systems and automation in the large building sector. The Council's projects promote the next generation of smart building technologies and incorporate a holistic approach that optimizes building performance and savings. <u>www.ashb.com/ibc</u>,

RUSTED ADVISOR



2. Administrative Bob Allan (NAVCO, Inc.)



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Approval of IBC Minutes November 7, 2024 www.ashb.com/ibc



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3. Research Update Harsha Chandrashekar (Honeywell International Inc.)



2025 Smart Building Trends & Technology Adoption



BELIÑO VOAIKIN LA BELTA DISTECH CONTROLS OUVYEROMEGA REFERENCE Functional Honeywell Johnson Devices Inc: Honeywell Johnson Controls Schneider SIEMENS Southwire TRANE 2025 IBC Landmark Research Smart Building Trends & Technology Adoption

Funders



DWYEROMEGA a measurable difference! Functional Devices, Inc. Honeywell Johnson Controls





Contact <u>admin@ashb.com</u> to obtain research findings and to join as a funder.



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3. Research Update Greg Walker (ASHB)



Annual BACS Market Sizing North America







4. Keynote Robert Lane (Robert H. Lane & Associates Inc.)





Cybersecurity Best Practices – Safeguarding Your Network and Building Systems

Presented by: Brad.Bonfiglio@se.com




Cybersecurity journey



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Cybersecurity breaches in building control systems or sensitive data can result in significant regulatory penalties, disrupt core operations, and damage business reputations, eroding consumer, employee, and investor trust.


Adopting a new approach to designing and managing intelligent building control systems is key.

CYBERTHREAT REAL-TIME ... kaspersky

2024 was one of the worst years yet on the cybersecurity front.

Average data breach is now cost \$4.9M and Ransomware is \$5.2M

NordLayer Trends & Statistics "Biggest data breaches of 2024" Dec. 16, 2024 https://nordlayer.com/blog/data-breaches-in-2024/






2024 Largest Data Breach

1.3 billion personal addresses, Social Security Numbers, and records.


Method – Unknown



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NordLayer Trends & Statistics "Biggest data breaches of 2024" Dec. 16, 2024 https://nordlayer.com/blog/data-breaches-in-2024/

Cybersecurity Incident Types




There is a hacker attack every 39 seconds

March 16, 2018 / Cybinet New

- Software or Device Flaw
- Human Error
- Malware

Cost Breakdown of a Cyberattack



Where the story begins...Industrial PLCs 2010

June 2010: Discovery of Stuxnet,1st worm developed to target automation system (Win PC & PLC). 1/3 of the centrifuges were destroyed. The Iranian nuclear program delayed by >2 years.



1. infection

Stuxnet enters a system via a USB stick and proceeds to infect all machines running Microsoft Windows. By brandishing a digital certificate that seems to show that it comes from a reliable company, the worm is able to evade automated-detection systems.

2. search

Stuxnet then checks whether a given machine is part of the targeted industrial control system made by Siemens. Such systems are deployed in Iran to run high-speed centrifuges that help to enrich nuclear fuel.

3. update

If the system isn't a target, Stuxnet does nothing; if it is, the worm attempts to access the Internet and download a more recent version of itself.



4. compromise

The worm then compromises the target system's logic controllers, exploiting "zero day" vulnerabilitiessoftware weaknesses that haven't been identified by security experts.



5. control

In the beginning, Stuxnet spies on the operations of the targeted system. Then it uses the information it has gathered to take control of the centrifuges, making them spin themselves to failure.



6. deceive and destroy Meanwhile, it provides false feedback to outside controllers, ensuring that they won't know what's going wrong until it's too late to do anything about it.



Where the story begins....Commercial Controls 2013

December 2013 Target Pays \$18.5M to 47 states!

May 2014 Profit Fall 46% or \$520M KrebsonSecurity In-depth security news and investigation

05 Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company

FEB 14

Last week, **Target** told reporters at *The Wall Street Journal* and *Reuters* that the initial intrusion into its systems was traced back to network credentials that were stolen from a third party vendor. Sources now tell KrebsOnSecurity that the vendor in question was a refrigeration, heating and air conditioning subcontractor that has worked at a number of locations at Target and other top retailers.

Sources close to the investigation said the attackers first broke into the retailer's network on Nov. 15, 2013 using network






Reducing Cybersecurity Attaches - A Risk-Based Approach



- Asset Identification
- Threat Identification
- Vulnerability Identification
- Existing Security Controls Identification
- Consequence Analysis
- Risk Ranking
- Security Controls Recommendations



Commercial Cybersecurity Is MORE Than Just IT Security




Do you think Re-Shuffling IT priorities will allow OT needs to be met?

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
Schneider

OT Cybersecurity Reference Architecture (Purdue Model)




"Defense in Depth"

- 1. Security Plan
- 2. Network Separation
- 3. Perimeter Protection
- 4. Network Segmentation
- 5. Device Hardening
- 6. Monitoring & Update



Electric

Potential Avenues of Compromise



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Defense in Depth - Step 1: Security Plan (Customer)

Define

- Roles and responsibilities
- Allowed activities, actions and processes
- Consequences of non-compliance

Full network assessment

- Communication paths
- Audit of all device
- Security settings
- Network drawings

Vulnerability assessment

- Potential threats
- Consequences, risk assessment and mitigation

Assessment and Design Service **Product Alerts Password Policy** Patch Updates



Example Policy: Password Management

- Change all default passwords
- Grant passwords only to people who need access; Prohibit sharing
- Do not display passwords during password entry
- Passwords should be strong
- Require users/applications to change passwords on a scheduled interval
- Remove employee access account when employment has terminated
- Require use of different passwords for different accounts, systems, and applications (i.e. roles)
- Passwords should not be transmitted electronically over the insecure Internet, such as via e-mail

Policies and procedures on password management are often lacking or missing entirely




Defense in Depth - Step 2: Network Separation (from Public)

Separate the Systems from the outside world

- Create a 'buffer' network (DMZ or demilitarized zone) between the BAS network and the rest of the world, using routers and firewalls
- Block inbound traffic to the BAS except through the DMZ firewall
- Limit outbound traffic to essential and authorized traffic only

DMZ host for servers

- Web Servers
- Cloud
- SQL Servers
- Mail Servers



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
Defense in Depth - Step 3: Perimeter Protection (VLANs)

Protect the BAS perimeter using a firewall

- Validate packets and protocols
- Manage authorization of certain data packets
- Restrict IP address or user access via authorization and authentication (Whitelist)


Secure remote accesses

- Use the VPN technology of routers and firewalls
- Use the latest authentication and authorization technologies; they're evolving fast



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Network Security – VLANS Example



Internal

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Defense in Depth - Step 3: Perimeter Protection

Firewall: A device for filtering packets based on source/destination IP address and protocol


Ingress and Egress filtering

• Source IP addresses should be very few

Rule placement

- Rules that address the expected traffic
- Permit Rules should have specific IP addresses and TCP/UDP port numbers

Only Pre-defined traffic should be allowed from the IT network to control network




Access List				
System Integrator	Port	NOE Address	Port	Allow
10.10.10.10	Port 80	192.168.10.10	80	ОК
10.10.10.10	Port 69	192.168.10.10	69	Block



Defense in Depth - Step 4: Network Segmentation & Zones (BAS sub-LANs)

- Apply normal firewall rules
- Deep packet inspection
 - Filter data requests to read/write
 - Limit access to specific registers/ports
 - Allow or disallow programming
 - MAC address filtering
- Use special rules to mitigate vulnerabilities by blocking before they reach the device



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Defense in Depth - Step 5: Device Hardening (IP Devices)

On all devices

- Replace default passwords with 'strong' passwords
- Shut off unused ports, communication services and hardware interfaces
- Set up broadcast limiter functions
- Use multicast message filtering

On Computers


 Forbid or seriously control the use of any external memory

On Software

 Set up all security features: passwords, user profiles, operator action logging

On network switches

 Restrict access on ports to assigned addresses only






Defense in Depth - Step 6: Monitor & Update

Monitor, Manage and Protect Service

- 24/7 remote security monitoring
- Configuration monitoring
- Reporting for Audit Compliance
- Network and Host Intrusion Detection systems

Monitor


- Authentication traps
- Windows Event Viewer
- Unauthorized login attempts
- Unusual activity
- Network load
- Device log files



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Network Security Best Practices

- Most BAS and Security System design do not cover network security in enough detail.
- Anti-virus is rarely included or defined
- No mention of Security aspects on Network Switches (Client/IT specified):
 - Port Security, Firewall
 - VLAN or VPN Separated entities, DMZ
- No 3rd party plugins (JAVA, Silverlight, etc.)
- DIARMF* compliant related projects





*Department of Defense Information Assurance Risk Management Framework

Designing for a Secure Solution

- Collaboration with the customer's IT department during the early part of the design process
- Consult with manufacturers to understand the product/software security features
- Specify latest versions of all software
- Develop specifications in combination with the customer's IT department
- Coordinate remote and local access as well as permanent or temporary network installation



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Best-in-class cybersecurity

- Advanced encryption & authentication
- IT system integration of password policies
- Full system backup, recovery & reconstitution
- Full Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL) practices (IEC & ISA)
- Cybersecurity for Sustainable Infrastructure



Best Practices

- Supporting IEC62443-4-1 (ISA99)
- Federal NIST 800 Series Baseline Requirements (US Gov. & Military)
- Compliance with DoD Risk Management Framework (RMF)
- EC 27034 Cybersecurity Policies
- TLS 1.3 encryption support
- System information & event monitoring (SIEM) integration
- Active Directory integration & Audit Logs



Questions



Published Resources

Five Best Practices to Improve BMS Cybersecurity

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<u>Cyber Security Portal -</u> <u>Schneider Electric</u>



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Schneider Electric is Supporting IEC62443 (ISA99, ISASecure) Certifications for product, processes, and people

International Industrial Cybersecurity Standards are emerging



- Local regulations and certifications pose a risk when working internationally.
- Some groups still applying IT security standards to OT offers, it can be done but needs to be done with experience and care ...

https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support /cybersecurity/security-notifications.jsp



THANK YOU!

Questions?



5. Smarter Homes & Buildings Podcast Chris Larry (Exp US Services Inc.)



Join industry experts and leaders from around the globe as they discuss everything smart home and intelligent buildings.



ASHB is looking for guests and hosts for future pre-recorded episodes. Contact <u>admin@ashb.com</u> for more information.

Recent Recordings:

- The Road to Decarbonization: Strategies for Critical Environments
- Beyond Traditional Appraisals & Unseen Liabilities: Rethinking Commercial Real Estate
- 'Killer Apps' and Actionable Data Migration: Make Yourself the Smart Building Hero!



6. ASHB Whitepapers Ken Wacks (Ken Wacks Associates)



Published IBC White Papers can be downloaded at: <u>ashb.com/whitepapers</u> Send proposals to <u>admin@ashb.com</u>

Recently Published






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6. ASHB Research Library Ken Wacks (Ken Wacks Associates)











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7. ASHB Journal Ken Wacks (Ken Wacks Associates)

Membership Networking Marketing Research & Information Ioin ASHB 0 CEDIA Expo Ken Wacks' Perspectives on CEDIA Expo: A/V & **Home Automation** By Kenneth Wacks | January 31, 2025

The ASHB Journal aims to educate and inform the ASHB membership and industry at large on emerging research, issues, challenges, and opportunities in the smart home and building sectors.

New articles are posted to the ASHB website, included in the weekly NewsBrief, and circulated on Twitter and LinkedIn.

Send proposals to admin@ashb.com

Recent posts:

- Ken Wacks' Perspectives on CEDIA Expo: A/V & Home Automation
- Ken Wacks' Perspectives: Saving Lives with Standards
- Ken Wacks' Perspectives: CES 2024 Re-positioning the industry

8. New Business Bob Allan (NAVCO, Inc.)



New IBC Business?







IFMA World Workplace March 12-13 | Netherlands

DISTRIBUTECH March 24-27 | Dallas, TX ISC West March 31-April 4 | Las Vegas, NV

LightFair May 4-8 | Las Vegas, NV

Haystack Connect May 6-8 | Washington, DC

Controls-Con May 8-9 | Detroit, MI

Realcomm IBcon June 3-4 | Savannah, GA



Next IBC Meeting: May 2025

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